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Abstrat
We desribe work in progress on how information struture inu-
enes the interpretation of disourse onnetives. We demonstrate this
inuene with an analysis of the two senses of although, distinguished
in the literature as denial of expetation and onessive opposi-
tion, rening earlier aounts that ignore information struture.
Keywords: information struture, alternative-set semantis,
disourse onnetives, onession, onventional impliature, prag-
mati pressupposition
1 Introdution
The disourse onnetive although is a prototypial marker for onession,
of whih there are two types: (i) a oneded expetation, whih we all de-
nial of expetation, following [Lako, 1971b℄ and [Lagerwerf, 1998℄ (f.
example (1)), and (ii) a oneded adversative relation, whih we all on-
essive opposition, following [Spooren, 1989℄ (f. example (2)).
(1) Although Greta Garbo was onsidered the yardstik of beauty, she
never married. [Lagerwerf, 1998℄

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(2) Although he does not have a ar, he has a bike. [Grote et al., 1995℄
The denial of expetation in (1) involves an underlying expetation, para-
phrasable as Beautiful women usually get married. In [Lagerwerf, 1998℄, this
is formulated as a defeasible rule, whih, in ase of Greta Garbo, is violated:
(3) Normally, if a woman is beautiful then she gets married.
In onessive opposition, the main lause does not express a failed ex-
petation, but rather a reason for drawing some onlusion with respet to a
ontextually pertinent open issue, so-alled terium omparationis (TC)
[Lagerwerf, 1998℄, that is opposite to the onlusion one would draw on the
basis of the subordinate lause. The onlusion drawn from the main lause
takes preedene. In (2), a possible TC is the mobility of the person under
disussion. The subordinate lause implies that he is not mobile, while the
main lause implies that he is. We an formulate the following defeasible
rules whose onlusions are in opposition for (2):
(4) Normally, if a person does not have a ar then he is not mobile.
(5) Normally, if a person has a bike then he is mobile.
We overview existing approahes to onession in Setion 2. What they
have all failed to aount for when interpreting either type of onession
is information struture. Consider the pair of examples in (6) and (7),
whih are modeled on examples in [Dretske, 1972℄ and [Rooth, 1985℄.
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(6) Although Clyde married Bertha, he did not inherit a penny.
(7) Although Clyde married Bertha, he did not inherit a penny.
These an be interpreted as either denial of expetation or onessive op-
position. As denial of expetation, (6) and (7) deny dierent expetations,
paraphrasable as (8) and (9), respetively.
(8) In normal irumstanes, if it is Bertha who Clyde marries, he in-
herits some money.
(9) In normal irumstanes, if what Clyde does with Bertha is to marry
her, he inherits some money.
1
Small apitals indiate words arrying pith aents, i.e., phonologially prominent
elements in eah sentene.
2
Similar observations hold for onessive opposition. Consider (6) and
(7) as responses to the question Is Clyde happy? : the question provides
the terium omparationis, and the main and subordinate lauses support
opposite onlusions. In both (6) and (7), the onlusion to be drawn from
the main lause, i.e., he didn't inherit a penny, is the same (i.e., Clyde isn't
happy). But what leads to the opposite onlusion (i.e., Clyde is happy)
diers in the subordinate lauses in (6) and (7):
(10) In normal irumstanes, if it is Bertha whom Clyde marries, then
he is happy.
(11) In normal irumstanes, if what Clyde does with Bertha is to marry
her, then he is happy.
We presented a preliminary information-struture sensitive analysis of
denial of expetation in [Kruij-Korbayova and Webber, 2000℄, where our
approah was to distinguish \appliability onditions" of the implied defea-
sible rules in aordane to information struture. However, it remained
unlear how they would be handled by a disourse update funtion. In
this paper we argue that all the dierenes due to information struture
an be aptured formally in terms of Rooth's notion of an alternative set
[Rooth, 1985, Rooth, 1992℄ and the alternative-set semantis of information
struture worked out in [Steedman, 2000, Steedman, 2001℄. We also extend
the analysis to inlude onessive opposition.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Setion 2 we summarize some ex-
isting approahes to onession, inluding the distintion proposed between
assertional and presuppositional omponents of its meaning. In Setion 3
we present our approah to information struture, whih is the formal ma-
hinery we employ in our information-struture sensitive aount of denial
of expetation in Setion 4, and onessive opposition in Setion 5. We
onlude with a summary and indiation of future diretions.
2 The Meaning of although
The distintion between onessive opposition and denial of expeta-
tion an be traed bak to Robin Lako [Lako, 1971b℄, in her explana-
tion of the onnetive but:
3
but an be used (i) in semanti opposition,
2
We ontinue to omit ontributions of tense, aspet and modality, under the assumption
that our analysis will not be invalidated by their eventual inorporation.
3
One of the reviewers kindly pointed out to us that an aount of the Frenh mais
('but') in terms of the opposition of expetation seems to be present in Oswald Durot's
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requiring a \ommon topi" and semanti similarity, or (ii) in denial of ex-
petation, without any notion of semanti opposition, but presupposing a
general tendeny or expetation. Using the ognitive primitives introdued
in [Sanders et al., 1992℄, onessive opposition an be haraterized as an
additive, negative, semanti or pragmati relation, while denial of expeta-
tion is haraterized as a ausal, negative, semanti or pragmati relation.
2.1 A Unied Interpretation Sheme
[Grote et al., 1995℄ have observed that despite the diversity of onessions
in their orpus of German text and in the literature, an underlying general
priniple an be extrated, relating propositions and impliations:
On the one hand, A holds, implying the expetation of C. On
the other hand, B holds, whih implies Not C, ontrary to the
expetation indued by A.
whih they apture in what they all the ABC-sheme, written as:
(12) i. A > C
ii. B > Not  C
(12i) is a defeasible rule, whih typially enodes general world knowledge,
either a rule of ause and eet or a ustomary expetation. (12ii) is a
defeasible rule indued from ontext. While A and B both hold, (12ii) is
onsidered stronger in the given situation, hene Not  C follows. One an
paraphrase this as Although A, nevertheless not-C, beause B.
Grote et al. also observed that various parts of the above ABC-sheme
an be verbalized or left impliit. Notably, when A and Not  C (and pos-
sibly B) are verbalized, we get denial of expetation. When A and B are
verbalized (and C is either impliit in the ontext or is expliitly mentioned),
we get onessive opposition. This is onsistent with the fat we have al-
ready noted that the same utterane(s) an be interpreted as either denial
of expetation or onessive opposition, depending on the ontext.
2.2 Assertion vs. Presupposition
[Lako, 1971b℄ also distinguished between the assertion and the presup-
position of a disourse onnetive. Her aount of but in the denial of
expetation use was formalized by George Lako [Lako, 1971a℄ as:
work, and that an extensive aount an be found in Jaques Jayez's work in Frenh.
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(13) S
1
but S
2
asserts the truth of both S
1
and S
2
,
and presupposes an expetation Exp(S
1
  S
2
).
[Lako, 1971a℄ also disusses the relation between presuppositions and re-
iproal ontrastive stress with respet to the onnetive and, together with
other disourse markers suh as then, too and either. Our own work expands
this early idea, inorporating the inuene of information struture.
Following these early eorts, [Karttunen, 1973℄ established the distin-
tion between the semanti and pragmati notions of presupposition. Later,
[Karttunen and Peters, 1979℄ identied the latter with the notion of on-
ventional impliature as speied in [Grie, 1975℄.
Semanti presupposition: sentene A semantially presupposes another
sentene B just in ase B is true whenever A is either true or false;
in other words, the truth of B is a ondition for the bivalene of A
[Karttunen, 1973, p.169℄
Pragmati presupposition (onventional impliature): to presuppose
something as a speaker is to take its truth for granted and to assume
that the audiene does the same [Karttunen, 1973, p.169℄. Surfae
sentene A pragmatially presupposes a logial form L, if and only if
it is the ase that A an be feliitously uttered only in ontexts whih
entail L [Karttunen, 1974, p.181℄
[Karttunen and Peters, 1979℄ pointed out that most ases of presupposition
disussed to-date were in fat onerned with the pragmati notion.
The laim that ausal disourse onnetives have presuppositions was
elaborated in [Lagerwerf, 1998℄. He assoiated the expetations indued by
ausal disourse onnetives with defeasible rules that might be expeted
but nevertheless fail to hold in the urrent ase:
(14) although  
 asserts: 
0
and 
0
 (pragmatially) presupposes: gen(
0
) > gen(:
0
)
where 
0
and 
0
stand for the propositions expressed by  and , > stands
for \defeasibly implies" in Asher and Morreau's ommon-sense entailment
[Asher and Morreau, 1991℄, and gen(X) stands for a generalization, i.e.,
an abstration reahable from proposition X. A similar treatment appeared
independently in [Knott, 1996℄ and [Knott and Mellish, 1996℄.
Lagerwerf applied the standard presupposition tests (inluding embed-
ding under negation or modal operators) and disourse ontext tests. The
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latter rely on the notion of satisfation of presuppositions within a larger
ontext dened rst in [Karttunen, 1974℄ and subsequently elaborated by
numerous authors ontributing to the researh on dynami semantis. Al-
though Lagerwerf noted diÆulties getting judgements on the embedding
tests, he onluded that the expetation underlying although   is a pre-
supposition, beause the disourse ontext tests ould be applied easily. But
if one keeps in mind the distintion between semanti and pragmati pre-
supposition, one should not be surprised that the embedding tests were
inappliable, while disourse ontext tests are equally appliable to both
semanti and pragmati presupposition (f. [Karttunen, 1973, p.171℄).
It is lear that in speaking of disourse onnetives as arrying presup-
positions of the sort involved in denial of expetation, authors have the
pragmati notion orresponding to the Griean notion of onventional im-
pliature in mind. So, we follow [Karttunen and Peters, 1979℄ in using the
term onventional impliature for the pragmati notion of presupposition.
3 Information Struture and Context Updating
Our laim is that dierenes in the onventional impliatures assoiated
with (6) and (7) ome from dierenes in their information struture
(IS), both in denial of expetation and onessive opposition. Therefore we
rst present our approah to IS and IS-sensitive ontext updating, before
moving on to our IS-sensitive interpretation of onession.
3.1 Information Struture
We follow the approah to IS proposed in [Steedman, 1996, Steedman, 2000,
Steedman, 2001℄. Steedman's main aim is to provide an IS-sensitive om-
positional analysis of English sentenes in ategorial grammar, ombining
phonologial and syntati struture. Building on the ndings originat-
ing in the Prague Shool [Firbas, 1992, Mathesius, 1975, Sgall et al., 1986℄,
Steedman reognizes two dimensions of IS: The rst denes a partition-
ing into Theme
is
and Rheme
is
; the seond is a further partitioning into
Bakground
is
and Fous
is
within eah Theme
is
and Rheme
is
.
4
The latter
partitioning is related to Halliday'sGiven-New dihotomy [Halliday, 1970,
4
Alternative terms used for similar (but not idential) IS partitions in other works are
Topi-Comment, Topi-Fous, Bakground(=Link+Tail)-Fous. We adopt Steedman's
terms, but add the subsripts in Theme
is
, Rheme
is
and Bakground
is
, Fous
is
in order
to avoid onfusion with the other uses of the same terms.
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Halliday, 1985℄ and onerns the distintion between elements in the sen-
tene's meaning whih ontribute to distinguishing the Theme
is
and the
Rheme
is
from other alternatives that the ontext makes available.
IS is established as a result of an interplay of fators, e.g. intonation,
word order and grammatial struture. Three possible IS partitions for the
string Clyde married Bertha are given below. Eah example is presented as
a reply to a question whih helps to x its IS. Small apitals indiate
words arrying a pith aent, underlining is used to mark the Rheme
is
.
(15) Q: I know Clyde has stopped dating Aretha, beause of a relationship
with someone else, and David is getting a divore. What's going on?
A: Clyde married Bertha.
i. ( P: P (
?
)) ( x: marry
0
(x;
?
b))
ii. -AS: f9P: P (); 9P: P (d)g
-AS: fmarry
0
(; a), date
0
(; b), marry
0
(; b)g
(16) Q: I know Clyde has stopped dating Aretha, beause he either mar-
ried or started dating someone else. Who is it?
A: Clyde married Bertha.
i. ( x:
?
marry
0
(; x)) ( Q: Q(
?
b))
ii. -AS: f9x: marry
0
(; x), 9x: date
0
(; x)g
-AS: fmarry
0
(; a);marry
0
(; b)g
(17) Q: I notied a hange in Clyde's relationship with Aretha and Bertha.
What's going on between him and his girlfriends?
A: Clyde married Bertha.
i. ( Q: Q(;
?
b)) ( x:y:
?
marry
0
(x; y))
ii. -AS: f9Q: Q(; a), 9Q: Q(; b)g
-AS: fdate
0
(; b), marry
0
(; b)g
For eah sentene, (i) provides a simplied IS-partitioned logial form,
where  and  are operators whih \wrap" Theme
is
and Rheme
is
, respe-
tively. The asterisks on terms in the semantis indiate elements belonging
to the Fous
is
-part under the Bakground
is
-Fous
is
partitioning with both
Theme
is
and Rheme
is
. We onsider the IS-partitioned logial forms to rep-
resent the linguisti meaning of the sentenes, and to serve as input for
a disourse (ontext) update funtion desribed below. In (ii), we pro-
vide the Theme
is
alternative set (-AS) and Rheme
is
alternative set (-AS),
whih are explained below. Pith aents in Theme
is
entail ontrast with
a previous Theme
is
, and the -AS thus ontains more than one element.
7
Without pith aents in Theme
is
, and thus without ontrast, the -AS
would be a singleton set.
Elaborating on Rooth's alternative semantis [Rooth, 1992℄, the seman-
tis assigned to IS in Steedman's approah is (f. [Steedman, 2001℄):
 Theme
is
presupposes a Rheme
is
-alternative set (-AS).
 Fous
is
within Rheme
is
restrits the -AS to the singleton set orre-
sponding to the asserted proposition.
 Theme
is
also presupposes a Theme-alternative set (-AS).
 Fous
is
within Theme
is
restrits the -AS to the singleton set orre-
sponding to Theme
is
.
-AS orresponds to what Rooth alls the ontextual alternative set
[Rooth, 1985, Rooth, 1992℄. -AS is a set of alternative themes with respet
to the ontext, orresponding to what Rooth alls the question alternative
set. The notion of alternative set is also losely related to the notion of
seondary denotation [Karttunen and Peters, 1979℄.
Following [Steedman, 2001℄, we take -AS to be a subset of the propo-
sitions supported by the ontext, whose harateristi funtion is obtained
systematially from the IS-partitioned logial form: speially, we replae
the  operator in Theme
is
with an existential quantier. -AS is then the
set of propositions that ould instantiate the resulting form in the given on-
text. -AS is onstruted in similarly. As noted in [Steedman, 2001, p.10℄,
alternative sets may not be exhaustively known to hearers, and in pratie
one would want to ompute with a more abstrat form.
3.2 IS-sensitive Context Updating
We follow [Krifka, 1993, Kruij-Korbayova, 1998, Steedman, 2001℄ in den-
ing the updating of an input ontext 
1
with an IS-partitioned logial form
p as omprising two phases, a Theme
is
update phase and a Rheme
is
update phase. Following [Karttunen, 1974℄ and urrent dynami seman-
tis work, we an then dene reursively when an input ontext admits an
IS-partitioned logial form (see Figure 1):
(18) 
1
admits p i:
 
1
admits (p): 
1
[(p)℄
2
,
 
2
admits (p): 
2
[(p)℄
3
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Figure 1: IS-sensitive update of ontext 
1
with p: 
1
[(p)℄
2
[(p)℄
3
c1 c2 c3
theme(p) rheme(p)
In the Theme
is
update phase, it is veried whether (p) is supported by
the input ontext 
1
.
5
This yields the ontext 
2
whih is either the same
as 
1
(if there is no ontrast within (p)) or dierent due to the presene of
ontrast in (p). The Rheme
is
update phase yields the nal ontext 
3
.
The update fails when any element of the update phase is not suessful.
Updating with although   involves at least three phases: a sequene
of two IS-sensitive updates, one lause at a time, followed by the derivation
and resolution of the onventional impliatures triggered by although. In
the next two setions, we fous on the third phase for denial of expetation
(Setion 4) and onessive opposition (Setion 5).
4 IS-Sensitive Denial of Expetation
Building on the semantis proposed for the denial of expetation interpreta-
tion of although   in [Lagerwerf, 1998, Lako, 1971a℄ and using the notion
of IS-sensitivity desribed in the previous setion, we an rene Lagerwerf's
(14) as in (19), with a further addition to be given in Setion 4.3:
(19) 
1
admits although p q i
i. assertions: 
1
admits p&q, i.e.,

1
admits p: 
1
[(p)℄
2
[(p)℄
3

3
admits q: 
3
[(q)℄
4
[(q)℄
5
ii. onventional impliature (pragmati presupposition):

1
admits p > not(q):

1
[(p)℄
2
[(p)℄
3
[(q)℄
4
[(q)℄
6
^ 
6
6=?
Here, not(q) stands for a negation of q in whih (q) is preserved and (q)
is replaed by its omplement, written as (q). What is new here is that
ontext 
4
must be updated not only by (q) but also by this omplement.
5
[Steedman, 2001℄ disusses ways in whih the urrent Theme
is
an relate to the input
ontext, but we don't exploit more than the simplest of these for the present examples.
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4.1 Negation as \suitable alternative"
Using the notion of alternative sets, the onventional impliature in (19) an
be formulated more generally as There exists q
0
whih is a suitable alternative
to q in the given ontext suh that normally if p then q
0
:
(19ii
0
) onventional impliature for although p q (denial of expetation):
9q
0
: q
0
2 -AS(q) ^ q
0
6= q ^ (
1
admits p > q
0
):

1
[(p)℄
2
[(p)℄
3
[(q)℄
4
[q
0
℄
6
^ 
6
6=?
where a suitable alternative to q depends on the disourse ontext and omes
from its Rheme
is
alternative set (-AS(q)). A trivial alternative to any
proposition orresponding to a sentene with the main verb inluded in the
Rheme
is
is a proposition with the opposite polarity. (19ii
0
) eetively means
that we model the denied expetation as a possibility: it must be possible
to update 
3
with both q and the alternative of q. The transition from 
3
via

4
to 
6
is a hypothetial one: In dynami semantis, it would orrespond
to a test of 
3
, whih sueeds unless there is ontrary information in the
ontext. Only if 
6
6=?, the \real" update from 
1
to 
5
is suessful.
Our semantis so far reognizes the role of information struture in iden-
tifying what is ontextually appropriate. This we illustrate in the next
setion with respet to examples (6) and (7). The following setion then
shows that information struture plays another role as well.
4.2 Examples
(6) Although Clyde married Bertha, he did not inherit a penny.
For (6), there are two possibilities for an IS-partitioning of the although-
lause: a \narrow-fous" and a \broad-fous" reading. We will deal with
eah in turn. To keep the number of analyses manageable, we will onsider
only the broad-fous" reading of the matrix lause.
(20) Although Clyde married Bertha, he did not inherit a penny.
i. IS-partitioned logial forms:
p : ( x: marry
0
(; x)) ( P: P (
?
b))
q : (  Q: Q()) ( y: :inherit
0
(y;money
0
))
ii. Theme
is
- and Rheme
is
-alternative sets:
-AS(p) : f9x: marry
0
(; x)g
-AS(p) : fmarry
0
(; a);marry
0
(; b)g
10
-AS(q) : f9Q: Q()g
-AS(q) : finherit
0
(;money
0
);:inherit
0
(;money
0
)g
6
iii. assertions:

1
[x: marry
0
(; x)℄
2
[P: P (b)℄
3
[Q: Q()℄
4
[y: :inherit
0
(y;money
0
)℄
5
iv. onventional impliature due to denial of expetation:

1
[x: marry
0
(; x)℄
2
[P: P (b)℄
3
[Q: Q()℄
4
[y: inherit
0
(y;money
0
)℄
6
^ 
6
6=?
That is, the update sueeds i In normal irumstanes, if Clyde marries
Bertha, it is possible for Clyde to inherit some money; Clyde marries Bertha;
Clyde does not inherit any money.
(21) Although Clyde married Bertha, he did not inherit a penny.
i. IS-partitioned logial forms:
p : ( P: P ()) ( x: marry
0
(x;
?
b))
q : ( y: :inherit
0
(y;money
0
)) (  Q: Q())
ii. Theme- and Rheme-alternative sets:
-AS(p) : f9P: P ()g
-AS(p) : fmarry
0
(; a);marry
0
(; b); date
0
(; b)g
-AS(q) : f9Q: Q()g
-AS(q) : finherit
0
(;money
0
);:inherit
0
(;money
0
)g
iii. assertions:

1
[P: P ()℄
2
[x: marry
0
(x; b)℄
3
[ Q: Q()℄
4
[y: :inherit
0
(y;money
0
)℄
5
iv. onventional impliature due to denial of expetation:

1
[P: P ()℄
2
[x: marry
0
(x; b)℄
3
[ Q: Q()℄
4
[y: inherit
0
(y;money
0
)℄
6
^ 
6
6=?
That is, the update again sueeds i In normal irumstanes, if Clyde
marries Bertha, it is possible for Clyde to inherit some money; Clyde mar-
ries Bertha; Clyde does not inherit any money. So far both the assertions
and onventional impliatures are the same for (20) and (21): They dier
only with respet to ontextual appropriateness and updating. In the next
setion, we show how the semantis diers as well.
6
For simpliity, we only onsider the extremes, i.e., inheriting all the money vs. not
inheriting any, although there are further possibilities in between, i.e., inheriting some,
muh, most, et. of the money.
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4.3 Expetation Perfetion
The important intuition whih we have not aptured so far is that the ele-
ment(s) in the Rheme
is
, e.g., Bertha in (20), marrying Bertha in (21) and
marrying in (7), are somehow speial, dierentiated from their alternatives
(in the given ontext). For example, in (20), it is not only the ase that
we expet that if Clyde marries Bertha he would inherit some money; (20)
also suggests that Bertha is a speial ase: for any alternative to Bertha,
we would normally expet no inheritane. Thus (7), (20) and (21) eah
give rise to two onventional impliatures under the denial of expetation
interpretation, whih an be paraphrased as:
(7
0
) a. In normal irumstanes, if what Clyde does with Bertha is
marry her, then he inherits some money.
b. In normal irumstanes, if what Clyde does with Bertha is
something other than marry her, then he does not inherit money.
(20
0
) a. In normal irumstanes, if what Clyde does is marry Bertha,
then he inherits some money.
b. In normal irumstanes, if what Clyde does is marry someone
other then Bertha, then he does not inherit money.
(21
0
) a. In normal irumstanes, if what Clyde does is marry Bertha,
then he inherits some money.
b. In normal irumstanes, if what Clyde does is something other
than marry Bertha, then he does not inherit money.
We apture this intuition by adding a seond defeasible rule, given here as
(22b) in addition to (19ii
0
), repeated here as (22a). (22a) says that there is
a suitable alternative q
0
to q suh that if p then in normal irumstanes q
0
.
(22b) says that all suitable alternatives p
0
to p are suh that if p
0
then in
normal irumstanes q. (For a shemati presentation, see Figure 2).
(22) onventional impliatures for although p q (denial of expetation):
a. 9q
0
: q
0
2 -AS(q) ^ q
0
6= q ^ (
1
admits p > q
0
):

1
[(p)℄
2
[(p)℄
3
[(q)℄
4
[q
0
℄
6
^ 
6
6=?
b. 8p
0
: p
0
2 -AS(p) ^ p
0
6= p ^ (
1
admits p
0
> q):

1
[(p)℄
2
[p
0
℄
3
0
[(q)℄
4
0
[(q)℄
5
0
^ 
5
0
6=?
We all the additional defeasible rule in (22b) expetation perfetion,
beause it is parallel to the notion of onditional perfetion proposed
in [Geis and Zwiky, 1971℄ to apture the fat that humans tend to perfet
12
Figure 2: IS-sensitive ontext update for denial of expetation.
c5
theme(q)
c1 c4
rheme(q)
c4’
rheme(q)
c5’
theme(q)
p’
c6
c3
c3’
c2
theme(p) rheme(p)
q’
onditionals to bi-onditionals. Expetation perfetion leads to the following
additional impliatures in the analyses in (20) and (21):
(20iv
0
) expetation perfetion for (20):

1
[x: marry
0
(; x)℄
2
[P: P (a)℄
3
0
[ Q: Q()℄
4
0
[y: :inherit
0
(y;money
0
)℄
5
0
^ 
5
0
6=?
That is, the additional ondition is that in a ontext in whih Aretha is an
alternative to Bertha with respet to marrying, the update sueeds i In
normal irumstanes, if Clyde marries Aretha, it is possible that Clyde does
not inherit any money.
(21iv
0
) expetation perfetion for (21):

1
[P: P ()℄
2
[x: date
0
(x; b)℄
3
0
[ Q: Q()℄
4
0
[y: :inherit
0
(y;money
0
)℄
5
0
^ 
5
0
6=?

1
[P: P ()℄
2
[x: marry
0
(x; a)℄
3
00
[ Q: Q()℄
4
00
[y: :inherit
0
(y;money
0
)℄
5
00
^ 
5
00
6=?
That is, the additional ondition is that in a ontext in whih dating Bertha
and marrying Aretha are alternative things that Clyde might do, the up-
date sueeds i In normal irumstanes, if Clyde dates Bertha or marries
Aretha, it is possible that Clyde inherits money.
The analysis of (7) ompletes the demonstration of our approah.
(7) Although Clyde married Bertha, he did not inherit a penny.
i. IS-partitioned logial forms:
p : ( P: P (; b)) ( x:y: marry
0
(x; y))
q : (  Q: Q()) ( z: :inherit
0
(z;money
0
))
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ii. Theme
is
- and Rheme
is
-alternative sets:
-AS(p) : f9P: P (; b)g
-AS(p) : fmarry
0
(; b); date
0
(; b)g
-AS(q) : f9Q: Q()g
-AS(q) : finherit
0
(;money
0
);:inherit
0
(;money
0
)g
iii. assertions:

1
[P: P (; b)℄
2
[x:y: marry
0
(x; y)℄
3
[ Q: Q()℄
4
[z: :inherit
0
(z;money
0
)℄
5
iv. onventional impliatures:
a. 
1
[P: P (; b)℄
2
[x:y: marry
0
(x; y)℄
3
[ Q: Q()℄
4
[y: inherit
0
(y;money
0
)℄
6
^ 
6
6=?
b. 
1
[P: P (; b)℄
2
[x:y: date
0
(x; y)℄
3
0
[ Q: Q()℄
4
0
[y: :inherit
0
(y;money
0
)℄
5
0
^ 
5
0
6=?
That is, the update sueeds i In normal irumstanes if Clyde marries
Bertha, it is possible for Clyde to inherit some money; In normal irum-
stanes, if Clyde dates Bertha, it is possible for Clyde not to inherit any
money; Clyde marries Bertha; Clyde does not inherit any money.
5 IS-Sensitive Conessive Opposition
The possibility of onventional impliature being involved in onessive op-
position was disussed in [Lagerwerf, 1998℄. Starting from the reasonable
assumption that if there is a (pragmati) presupposition (onventional im-
pliature), it should involve the terium omparationis (TC), Lagerwerf on-
sidered the possibility that what is presupposed might be (i) the TC itself,
(ii) the negation of the TC, (iii) the onjuntion of the TC and it negation,
(iv) their disjuntion, or (v) the onjuntion of the possibility of TC and
the possibility of the negation of the TC. He onluded that onessive op-
position does not involve presupposition. What we want to show is that it
does: First, the TC is onventionally impliated as an open issue, and se-
ond, eah of the relata onventionally impliates an expetation, and these
expetations lead to opposite onlusions with respet to the TC.
Consider the following examples: the question in (23) establishes the
TC as the open issue whether Clyde is happy, and (7, 20, 21) are possible
responses. We are onerned with the IS-sensitivity of onessive opposition
and the onventional impliatures that the response give rise to. The latter
are paraphrased in (a) through (d) for eah example.
7
7
However artiial, it is onvenient to ontinue to use the same sentene(s) beause we
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(23) Q. Is Clyde happy?
(7) Although Clyde married Bertha, he did not inherit a penny.
a. In normal irumstanes, if what Clyde does with Bertha is to
marry her, then Clyde is happy.
b. In normal irumstanes, if what Clyde does with Bertha is
something else than marrying her, then Clyde is not happy.
. In normal irumstanes, if what happens to Clyde is that he
does not inherit a penny, then Clyde is not happy.
d. In normal irumstanes, if what happens to Clyde is something
else than not inheriting a penny, then Clyde is happy.
(20) A. Although Clyde married Bertha, he did not inherit a penny.
a. In normal irumstanes, if Clyde marries Bertha, then Clyde is
happy.
b. In normal irumstanes, if Clyde marries someone else than
Bertha, then Clyde is unhappy.
. same as (23)
d. same as (23d)
(21) Although Clyde married Bertha, he did not inherit a penny.
a. In normal irumstanes, if what Clyde does is marry Bertha,
then Clyde is happy.
b. In normal irumstanes, if what Clyde does is something else
than marry Bertha, then Clyde is not happy.
. same as (23)
d. same as (23d)
Given that the matrix lause in onessive opposition has a stronger argu-
mentative fore, the polarity of the answer in all ases depends on whether
we take Clyde's not inheriting any money to entail that he is happy or un-
happy. (Here we have hosen the latter.) Sine we have kept the matrix
lauses the same, their analyses and thus the answers are the same in all
have already presented their detailed IS analysis. Naturally-ourring examples however
are not rare { for example, the following from a FAQ sheet on PERL:
Q: Can I use Perl regular expressions to math balaned text?
A: Although Perl regular expressions are more powerful than \mathematial"
regular expressions, they still aren't powerful enough....
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ases. Where the examples dier is what is responsible for the opposite ex-
petation derived from the although-lause. As with denial of expetation,
it is the Rheme
is
in eah ase that determines the speial ase for whih the
opposite expetation holds. For any of the Rheme
is
-alternatives, there is no
suh opposite expetation.
How an we formalize the TC? Aording to [Hamblin, 1973℄, a question
determines a set of potential answers. A further onnetion between the
set of potential answers and Rooth's notion of ontextual alternative set has
been made in [Rooth, 1992℄. It is this alternative set, i.e., our -AS, that
we take to be the TC in the presene of an expliit question.
Both yes/no and wh-questions an establish a TC. For example, (25) in
response to (24Q1-Q3) an be interpreted as having the same TC, (26).
(24) Q1 Shall we go to King Tsin?
Q2 Shall we go to King Tsin or to China First?
Q3 Whih restaurant shall we go to?
(25) Although King Tsin has great mu shu pork, China First has good
dim sum.
(26) fgo to
0
(speaker
+
; kt); go to
0
(speaker
+
; hf)g.
In the absene of an expliit question, the TC has to be inferred from the on-
text and the relata. We model this by the TC being onventionally implied
as a ontextually available alternative set. Using the notion of IS-sensitivity
desribed earlier and employing alternatives and expetation perfetion as
we did for denial of expetation, we an dene when a ontext admits the
onessive opposition interpretation of although   (see also Figure 3):
(27) 
1
admits although p q i
i. assertions: 
1
admits p&q (as with denial of expetation)
ii. onventional impliatures for onessive opposition:
a. 9R: R = fr
1
; r
2
; : : : ; r
n
g is a ontextual alternative set
b. (
1
admits p > r
1
^ (
3
admits q > r
2
):

1
[(p)℄
2
[(p)℄
3
[r
1
℄
4
^ 
4
6=? ^

3
[(q)℄
5
[(q)℄
6
[r
2
℄
7
^ 
7
6=?
. 9r
1
0
; r
2
0
2 R: r
1
0
6= r
1
^ r
2
0
6= r
2
^ r
1
0
6= r
2
0
^
8p
0
:8q
0
: p
0
2  AS(p) ^ p
0
6= p ^ q
0
2  AS(q) ^ q
0
6= q ^
(
1
admits p
0
> r
1
0
) ^ (
1
admits q
0
> r
2
0
):

1
[(p)℄
2
[p
0
℄
3
0
[r
1
0
℄
4
0
^ 
4
0
6=? ^

5
[q
0
℄
6
0
[r
2
0
℄
7
0
^ 
7
0
6=?
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Figure 3: IS-sensitive ontext update for denial of expetation.
c4
c1
c7’
c7c2
theme(p) rheme(p)
c3
theme(q)
c5
rheme(q)
c6’
c6
r2
r2’
r1
p’
q’
c3’
r1’
c4’
That is, a ontextual alternative set R is onventionally impliated; p defea-
sibly implies some member of R; every alternative p
0
to p defeasibly implies
the omplement of R; similarly for q, whih defeasibly implies a member of
R distint from the member implied by p. A minimal set R ontains just
two alternatives, r
1
and r
2
, and then r
1
0
= r
2
and r
2
0
= r
1
. R reets
the TC, whih an be established by the preeding ontext fully or partially.
(If it is impliit, the interpreter must gure it out, where the relata in the
onessive opposition relation an provide important lues.)
We illustrate (27ii) in full for one example:
(20) Although Clyde married Bertha, he did not inherit a penny.
i. IS-partitioned logial forms: as in (7i)
ii. Theme
is
- and Rheme
is
-alternative sets: as in (7ii)
iii. assertions: as in (7iii)
iv. onventional impliatures for onessive opposition:
a. 9R: R = fr
1
; r
2
g
b. 
1
[x: marry
0
(; x)℄
2
[P: P (b)℄
3
[r
1
℄
4
^ 
4
6=?
. 
3
[Q: Q()℄
5
[y: :inherit
0
(y;money
0
)℄
6
[r
2
℄
7
^ 
7
6=?
d. 
1
[x: marry
0
(; x)℄
2
[P: P (a)℄
3
0
[r
1
0
℄
4
0
^ 
4
0
6=?
e. 
1
[Q: Q()℄
5
[y: inherit
0
(y;money
0
)℄
6
0
[r
2
0
℄
7
^ 
7
0
6=?
The update sueeds, i In normal irumstanes, if Clyde marries Bertha
it is possible that r
1
; In normal irumstanes, if Clyde marries Aretha it is
possible that r
1
0
; In normal irumstanes, if Clyde does not inherit money
it is possible that r
2
; In normal irumstanes, if Clyde inherits money it
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is possible that r
1
0
; Clyde marries Bertha and Clyde does not inherit any
money. In the presene of an expliit question as in (23), we take the
minimal alternative set ontaining just the alternatives r
1
(e.g., happy().)
and r
2
(e.g., unhappy()), while r
1
0
= r
2
and r
2
0
= r
1
. Even without
an expliit question, the preeding ontext may establish an alternative set
whih an serve as the TC. Otherwise, a suitable alternative set has to be
aommodated.
To onlude this setion, we return to Grote et al.'s ABC-sheme (Se-
tion 2.1). When we replae negation with the notion of a suitable alternative
(Setion 4.1) and add expetation perfetion (Setion 4.3), we get the fol-
lowing extended sheme:
(28) augmented ABC-sheme
i. A > C (as before)
ii. B > C
0
(a suitable alternative instead of negation)
iii. A
0
> C
0
(expetation perfetion)
iv. B
0
> C (expetation perfetion)
whereX
0
is a suitable alternative toX. In denial of expetation, although  
verbalizes A (in ) and C
0
(in ), C and C
0
are members of the Rheme
is
-
alternative set orresponding to , andA andA
0
are members of the Rheme
is
-
alternative set orresponding to . In onessive opposition, although  
verbalizes A (in ) and B (in ), C and C
0
are members of the ontextual
alternative set orresponding to the terium omparationis, A and A
0
are
members of the Rheme
is
-alternative set orresponding to , and B and B
0
are members of the Rheme
is
-alternative set orresponding to .
6 Summary
In our earlier paper [Kruij-Korbayova and Webber, 2000℄, we identied the
following further steps to be aomplished in the larger enterprise of un-
derstanding how sentene-level semanti phenomena, like IS, interat with
disourse-level phenomena, suh as disourse relations, whih in turn an be
signaled in part by disourse onnetives:
 to look at other onnetives and work out additional examples of the
ones we have already onsidered
 to onsider the interplay of intonation and word order in relation to
disourse onnetives
18
 to investigate the relation between IS and loal vs. global aommo-
dation of presuppositions.
In this paper, we have ontinued along the lines speied above: (1)
We laried what the relevant notion of presupposition is in onession,
namely, that we are onerned with the pragmati presupposition, whih
orresponds to the Griean notion of onventional impliature. (2) We re-
vised and improved the IS-sensitive analysis of the denial of expetation
use of although, fully asting it in terms of ontextual alternative sets. (3)
We proposed an IS-sensitive analysis of another sense of although, namely
onessive opposition; this analysis uses the same formal mahinery as the
analysis of the denial of expetation relying on alternative sets. Also the
terium omparationis is represented as a ontextual alternative set.
We hope in the oming year to make a small implementation (probably
using Johan Bos' DORIS system
8
) for individual lauses and their IS, and
then for omplex sentenes or sequenes thereof related by onnetives.
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